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Stealing five minutes of extra sleep in the morning is not an unusual way for
someone to begin his day. The alarm simply rings again, he gets up, carries on his
routine at an accelerated pace, and is no worse for the wear. But sitting back idly
while the second hand makes five slow rotations is not always so innocuous. In
many instances, minutes—and even fractions thereof—are critical.
One context in which snoozing is less acceptable is organ donation. Organs
are sustained by the oxygen and nutrients they receive from circulating blood. When
an organ donor dies and his heart stops pumping blood, doctors have mere minutes
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to remove his organs before they are irreparably degraded by lack of blood flow.1
With that in mind, most states have drafted their death-determination statutes to
allow for speedy organ harvesting.2 Not Virginia; Virginia hits the snooze button on
organ procurement.
Virginia’s codification of what constitutes death is very different in one respect
from most other states’ death statutes.3 Though every state embraces both cardio-
pulmonary and neurological definitions of death, and every state respects legitimate
Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders, Virginia has a requirement most states do not
have. Virginia commands that before an individual can be declared dead, a physician
must determine that artificial cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) would not be
successful in resuscitating the individual.4 This is the case even when the individ-
ual has a valid DNR order.5 Virginia’s law has a tremendous impact on the effective-
ness of harvesting organs and implicates potential donors’ fundamental rights to
privacy and death.
Part I of this Note describes the mechanics of and laws pertaining to organ
transplantation. This sets the stage for understanding why Virginia’s law ought to
undergo a constitutional analysis. It examines how the meaning of “death” has
evolved over time and scrutinizes critical language within these definitions. These
details directly impact the rate at which organs can be recovered. Part II focuses on
how Virginia’s death-determination criteria differ from the way in which the ma-
jority of states interpret the Uniform Determination of Death Act. Part III analyzes
the constitutional implications of Virginia’s law as compared to the requirements
endorsed by the rest of the country. Here, the Note examines the right to privacy
and how death-determination statutes affect this fundamental right. It also assesses
Virginia’s potential infringement of the right to death. Both of these subsections
examine whether the Commonwealth has compelling enough interests to enact such
legislation. Finally, Part IV offers recommendations, ultimately urging Virginia to
1 See Maxine M. Harrington, The Thin Flat Line: Redefining Who is Legally Dead in
Organ Donation After Cardiac Death, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 340 (2009) (citing N.Y. City
Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686, 689 (Sup. Ct. 1975)) (describing how or-
gans that are no longer receiving a supply of blood are not of the best transplantable quality).
2 See infra Part II.A.
3 See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972(A)(1) (2010 & Supp. 2011); see also infra Part II.
4 § 54.1-2972(A)(1) (“A person shall be medically and legally dead if . . . attempts at
resuscitation would not, in the opinion of [a] physician, be successful in restoring sponta-
neous life-sustaining functions.”).
5 Id. at § 54.1-2972(A)–(B). The statute does not contain an exception to the mandate
that physicians determine CPR would be unsuccessful in resuscitating the individual for
those with DNR orders. See id. The only DNR exception is when death is being pronounced
by registered nurses and physician assistants, who may pronounce death in very narrow
circumstances. Id.
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reconsider its death-determination law, which likely offends constitutional pro-
tections afforded to privacy and death.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1954, Dr. Joseph Murray conducted the first successful organ transplant by
implanting a live donor’s kidney into the body of his twin brother.6 He performed
a similar procedure using a deceased donor eight years later.7 By the early 1980s,
surgeons had transplanted kidneys, livers, pancreases, intestines, hearts, and lungs re-
moved from cadaveric donors into unrelated recipients.8 Today, tens of thousands of
lives are saved each year in the United States with this breakthrough medical science.9
This would not have occurred, however, without the evolution of the standards gov-
erning harvesting and transplantation.
In the early days of organ donation, the only sources of vital organs were de-
ceased individuals.10 This was due in part to a mandate known as the “dead donor
rule,” which makes it unacceptable to harvest vital organs from living humans.11
During these early days, death was defined by common law as the “cessation of
life . . . a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal
6 COMM. ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, BD. ON HEALTH SCIS. POL’Y,
ORGAN DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 18 (James F. Childress & Catharyn T.
Liverman eds., 2006) [hereinafter OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION].
7 Peter L. Abt et al., Donation after Cardiac Death in the US: History and Use, 203 J.
AM. COLL. SURGEONS 208, 209 (2006).
8 See History, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/donation
/index.php?topic=history (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (noting that the first kidney transplant
occurred in 1954, the first pancreas and heart transplants in 1968, the first lung transplant in
1983, and the first intestine transplant in 1987).
9 As of late October 2011, 523,459 organs had been transplanted in the United States.
Transplants by Donor Type, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http:
//optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (follow “Data” menu item and choose
“View Data Reports”; select “National Data” and choose category “transplant”; follow the
“Transplants by Donor Type” hyperlink).
10 Abt, supra note 7, at 208.
11 “The ‘dead-donor rule’ refers to two widely accepted ethical norms that govern prac-
tices of organ procurement for transplantation: (1) vital organs should be taken only from
dead patients, and (2) living patients should not be killed for or by organ procurement.”
Dead-Donor Rule, ASCENSION HEALTH, http://www.ascensionhealth.org/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=135&itemid=172 (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (citing Stuart
J. Youngner & Robert M. Arnold, Ethical, Psychological, and Public Policy Implications of
Procuring Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver Donors, 269 JAMA 2769 (1993)); see
also OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION, supra note 6, at 128 (citing John A. Robertson, The Dead
Donor Rule, 29 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 6 (1999)) (stating that the dead donor rule requires that
“organ donation . . . not cause or hasten death”).
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and vital functions . . . such as respiration, pulsation, etc.”12 When a donor’s heart
and lungs stopped operating, physicians could begin the harvesting process without
violating the dead donor rule. These donors were referred to as “non-heart-beating
donors,”13 and the procedure was termed “donation after cardiac death” (DCD).14
While this was sometimes successful, organs often experienced warm ischemia—
deterioration resulting from oxygen deprivation due to lack of circulation—before
transplantation.15 This significantly decreased the likelihood of success for organ
transplants.16 Because the harvesting of vital organs could only occur after the do-
nor’s death, and because death was defined as a cessation of cardiopulmonary
function, organs to be donated necessarily experienced some degree of oxygen
deprivation, limiting their lifesaving potential.17 It was not until legal standards
underwent a transformation that organ donation became a larger success.18
A. Defining “Death”
In 1968, just as the medical community began to accept organ transplantation
as a viable solution to managing a variety of illnesses, the Ad Hoc Committee of the
Harvard Medical School released an opinion on an alternative definition of death
12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed., rev. 1968), quoted in Jason L. Goldsmith,
Note, Wanted! Dead and/or Alive: Choosing Among the Not-So-Uniform Statutory Definitions
of Death, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 871, 879 n.42 (2007); see also Goldsmith, supra, at 879 n.42
(describing how this “cardiopulmonary-centric” entry was “subsequently revised by the first
‘post-death-legislation era’ edition to encompass a broader conception: ‘Death. The cessation of
life; permanent cessation of all vital functions and signs.’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
360 (5th ed. 1979))).
13 Jerry Menikoff, Doubts About Death: The Silence of the Institute of Medicine, 26 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 157, 157 (1998) (citing Y.W. Cho et al., Transplantation of Kidneys from
Donors Whose Hearts Have Stopped Beating, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 221, 221–25 (1998))
(defining non-heart-beating donors as “individuals who are declared dead not as a result of
direct measurements of brain function, but rather as a result of the cessation of heart and
respiratory functions”).
14 Harrington, supra note 1, at 337 (explaining that donation after cardiac death involves
transplants “using donors whose heart and lung functions have ceased, but who are not yet
brain dead”).
15 INST. OF MED., NON-HEART-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: PRACTICE AND
PROTOCOLS XV, at 7–8, 22 (2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=
9700 [hereinafter IOM REPORT 2000].
16 Harrington, supra note 1, at 338 (“The closer the donor is to life, the more useful the
organs will be to the recipient.”).
17 IOM REPORT 2000, supra note 15, at 7–8 (citing M. Devita et al., A History of Organ
Donation by Patients with Cardiac Death, 3 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 131 (1993) and
INST. OF MED., NON-HEART-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: MEDICAL AND ETHICAL
ISSUES IN PROCUREMENT (1997)).
18 Id. at 8.
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based on neurological criteria.19 This involves “irreversible coma”—the death of the
whole brain20—and would come to bolster the success of organ donation.21 Individuals
who are brain dead may still maintain circulatory and pulmonary functions by arti-
ficial means.22 Because these patients are already considered deceased, surgeons can
remove their organs while they are still connected to ventilators and their circulation
is intact.23 This process greatly reduces damage to organ tissues from oxygen depri-
vation and lack of perfusion pressure.24 Preventing such damage is imperative to the
success of later transplantation.25 States looked favorably upon this new definition
of death, and by 1980, twenty-four states had codified brain death as a legal criterion
for death.26
The same year, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research drafted the Uniform Determination
of Death Act (UDDA)27 and recommended its adoption.28 The UDDA states that “[a]n
individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and res-
piratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, is dead.”29 Today, the majority of states have either adopted
the UDDA or drafted their own legislation accepting a neurological determination of
19 Harrington, supra note 1, at 341 (citing Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205
JAMA 85, 85 (1968)).
20 Id. at 341 n.47; OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION, supra note 6, at 18.
21 Abt, supra note 7, at 214.
22 Sarah D. Barber, Note, The Tell-Tale Heart: Ethical and Legal Implications of In Situ
Organ Preservation in the Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver Donor, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 471, 471
(1996) (describing how DND donor organs “can be maintained in a healthy condition through
the use of life support”).
23 Id.
24 Harrington, supra note 1, at 340 (stating that recovering organs that were still receiving
blood “would avoid the problem of warm ischemia time associated with circulatory death”).
25 See ROGER HERDMAN & JOHN POTTS, NON-HEART-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION:
MEDICAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROCUREMENT 24 (1997) (describing the “ideal conditions
for organ recovery” as a donor “with the shortest time between absence of circulation and
removal of organs”). In general, “recovered organs are stored in a cold organ preservation
solution” to prevent deterioration after removal from the body. They can remain in solution
for several hours, depending on organ type, before transplantation. Donor Matching System,
ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/about
/transplantation/matchingProcess.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
26 Richard M. Zaner, Introduction to DEATH: BEYOND WHOLE-BRAIN CRITERIA 2 (Richard
M. Zaner ed., 1988).
27 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12A U.L.A. 781 (1980).
28 PRESIDENT’S COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED.
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND
ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 2 (1981) [hereinafter DEFINING DEATH].
29 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1.
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death.30 Because of this and the success of organ transplants from brain-dead donors,
donation after neurological death (DND)31 has almost completely replaced DCD
over the past several years.32
B. “Irreversibility”
Despite advances in science, DND, and widespread acceptance of organ donation,
the demand for organs far exceeds its supply.33 The government and medical commu-
nity have been seeking ways to increase the availability of organs for patients in need.34
One potential strategy is to expand the donor pool to once again include non-heart-
beating donors—that is, to use DCD.35 This process, however, has grown complicated
with the development of new technologies. In the early days of organ transplantation,
when an individual stopped breathing and his heart stopped pumping blood, death was
almost certainly inevitable.36 There was only the small chance a patient might “auto-
resuscitate” or resume cardiopulmonary function spontaneously.37 It was relatively
30 Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 889–90.
31 In typical cases, patients with massive brain injury are diagnosed as
brain dead while on mechanical ventilation in an intensive care unit
(ICU). Physicians perform a series of clinical tests for neurological
function. The diagnosis requires that the patient be in a coma and dem-
onstrate no response to battery tests that assess brainstem function. . . .
If the findings persist, . . . then the patient is diagnosed as dead. . . . If
the patient and family desire to donate organs and if the patient is a
suitable candidate, then the patient is taken to the operating room for
organ recovery and transplantation, while mechanical ventilation is con-
tinued and with the beating heart still perfusing the patient’s organs.
Robert D. Truog, Brain Death—Too Flawed to Endure, Too Ingrained to Abandon, 35 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 273, 273 (2007) (citation omitted).
32 Christopher James Doig & David A. Zygun, (Uncontrolled) Donation after Cardiac
Determination of Death: A Note of Caution, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 760, 760 (2008) (stating
that DND has “replaced DCD as the major source of cadaveric organs for transplant in North
America”); Suzanne A. Fiddler, Implementing Donation After Cardiac Death Protocols, 2
J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 123, 125 (2008) (stating that “the transplant and organ procurement
organization communities essentially abandoned DCD” because of the advantages offered
by DND).
33 OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION, supra note 6, at 46 (describing the “widening gap be-
tween the supply of transplantable organs and the number of patients on the waiting list”).
34 Id. at 31–32.
35 Id. at 127.
36 See Barber, supra note 22, at 486 (discussing how today’s technology “routinely brings
people back from ‘death’”).
37 James L. Bernat, The Boundaries of Organ Donation After Circulatory Death, 359 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 669, 670–71 (2008); K. Hornby et al., A Systematic Review of Autoresuscitation
After Cardiac Arrest, 38 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1246, 1247 (2010) (citing E.F. Wijdicks & M.N.
Diringer, Electrocardiographic Activity After Terminal Cardiac Arrest in Neurocatastrophes,
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straightforward to determine when an individual had perished.38 Today, machines
can resuscitate those who suffer cardiac arrest; the cessation of circulatory and pul-
monary functions can be reversed.39 Instead of facing certain death after cardiac arrest,
patients today can be revived.40 This means that when doctors remove life support
systems, the patient may not necessarily die—cardiopulmonary resuscitation may
revive the patient.41 This presents a problem in harvesting organs; if a patient has a
chance of revival, a surgeon cannot remove his vital organs without violating the
dead donor rule.42 The cessation of cardiopulmonary functions must be irreversible
before organ procurement may commence.43 Thus, one must wait until there is no
chance of resuscitation. The longer circulatory function is absent, the more likely it
is irreversible.44 Yet this is complicated by the fact that the longer one waits, the less
likely the organs harvested will be transplanted successfully.45
The Institute of Medicine has determined that five minutes is an appropriate
amount of time to be medically certain that cardiopulmonary activity has perma-
nently ceased,46 but state statutes vary as to the amount of time required.47 A greater
62 NEUROLOGY 673–74 (2004)) (stating that auto-resuscitation “is the phenomenon of the
heart being able to restart spontaneously and generate anterograde circulation”).
38 See id. at 1246 (“The availability of life-sustaining interventions . . . has obscured our
ability to distinguish between the seemingly discrete states of life and death.”).
39 Paul C. Sorum, Limiting Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 57 ALB. L. REV. 617, 617
(1994) (explaining the use of CPR and how it can restore cardiac function).
40 Id.
41 See Bernat, supra note 37, at 670–71 (discussing how a heart can be restarted, even
after it has been transplanted to another patient).
42 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
43 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
44 See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 28, at 17 (“Once deprived of adequate supplies of
oxygen and glucose, brain neurons will irreversibly lose all activity and ability to function.”).
45 OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION, supra note 6, at 131 (explaining that successful transplan-
tation requires minimization of the length of time in which the organ is deprived of oxygen).
46 IOM REPORT 2000, supra note 15, at 22–24 (explaining the 1997 Report’s determi-
nation of a five-minute interval has been accepted by some organ procurement organizations
and that further study of the interval’s validity has not been undertaken).
47 “U.S. guidelines were either silent or varied significantly with respect to the period of
time organ retrieval could begin after heart stoppage. Some allowed organ retrieval imme-
diately after cardiac arrest, while others mandated a waiting period ranging from sixty seconds
to five minutes.” Harrington, supra note 1, at 348.
Twelve OPO protocols dictate that the declaration of death and begin-
ning of organ removal shall occur a few minutes (60 seconds, 2 minutes,
4 to 5 minutes, etc.) after detection of cardiac arrest. . . . Several proto-
cols declare death and begin procurement immediately ‘after deter-
mination of cardiac arrest,’ making no reference to any pause after the
final heartbeats.
HERDMAN & POTTS, supra note 25, at 40–41.
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dispute is taking place over what “irreversible” means.48 The Institute of Medicine
and transplant community define “irreversible death” to mean that the patient is
unable to auto-resuscitate and has a DNR order in place (i.e., he will not be resusci-
tated artificially).49 Virginia does not subscribe to the theory that lacking auto- and
artificial resuscitation, an individual is permanently dead; instead it requires a phy-
sician to delay a death declaration—and therefore organ harvesting—until he de-
termines that artificial resuscitative attempts would not be effective, despite a DNR
order.50 Virginia’s technique, and how it differs from those of other states, may be
cause for concern.
II. VARIATION AMONG STATES IN DETERMINING DEATH
In a nation with fifty sovereign states, variation in regulatory matters is difficult
to avoid. Often, legislators do not try to evade it; Americans accept that different
states have different laws. Virginia’s death-determination distinctions alone do not
raise issues. The determination law is problematic, however, if it infringes on the
constitutional rights of those it affects. A closer examination of states’ varying
codifications of death determinations may bring some of the potential implications
of Virginia’s law to light.
A. Uniform Determination of Death Act Majority Process
The uncertainty as to when death occurs—or, more precisely, when legal death
ought to be said to have occurred—is perhaps the most contentious issue in organ
donation. Despite the fact that most American jurisdictions have adopted the
Uniform Determination of Death Act in some form,51 the procedures for determin-
ing death are far from uniform.52 Legal scholars, medical professionals, and the
transplant community debate an event that laypeople for centuries had no difficulty
establishing—when one’s life is extinguished.53 One of the primary barriers to agree-
ment is the determination of what constitutes irreversibility, a term the UDDA does not
define, but includes in its definition of death.54 The Institute of Medicine (IOM), in its
2000 report, has offered three possible interpretations for “irreversible” in this context:
48 Harrington, supra note 1, at 352 (noting that “[n]either the UDDA nor its state coun-
terparts define the term irreversible”).
49 Id. at 354.
50 See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972(A)(1) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
51 Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 890.
52 See id. at 917–18.
53 See, e.g., Bernat, supra note 37, at 671 (discussing a new medical study recommending
a 75-second lack of cardiac electric activity—or “asystole”—the IOM recommendation of
a five-minute interval, the two-minute interval used by some protocols, and the need to de-
termine intervals by “scientific and public policy considerations”).
54 Harrington, supra note 1, at 354.
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(1) [T]he patient’s circulation will not spontaneously resume
absent outside intervention (autoresuscitation); (2) the patient’s
circulation will not be reversed because the patient or family has
chosen to withdraw life support and to refuse further resusci-
tative efforts; or (3) the patient’s circulation can not be reversed,
even with cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or other tech-
nical means.55
In its adoption of two to five minutes as the acceptable waiting period before
harvesting organs, the IOM has embraced the first two constructions enumerated
above.56 It is highly improbable that a patient will auto-resuscitate after five minutes
have elapsed,57 and if he has effected a DNR order, he will not be revived by arti-
ficial means.58 Essentially, this patient has no chance of recovery after five minutes
of cardiac arrest, assuming the physicians respect his DNR order. Therefore, no
ethical breach is associated with organ procurement after five minutes of cardiac
arrest when a DNR order exists.59
Recall that the third construction requires a physician to wait until CPR would
no longer be effective to declare time of death, whether or not the patient has entered
a DNR order.60 If harvesting occurs after only five minutes in a jurisdiction that adopts
exclusively this third construction, the dead donor rule is necessarily violated be-
cause organ procurement began while there was still an opportunity for resuscitation.
Individuals may be successfully artificially resuscitated after five minutes of absent
cardiopulmonary activity.61 This may be why the IOM appears to reject the third con-
struction of “irreversibility,” which necessarily inhibits successful organ donation
by increasing the time organs are allowed to deteriorate without blood supply.62
55 Id. (citing IOM REPORT 2000, supra note 15, at 24).
56 Harrington, supra note 1, at 354.
57 Bernat, supra note 37, at 671 (recounting that “autoresuscitation has never been reported
after 65 seconds of asystole,” and that the longest a human auto-resuscitated after cardiac
arrest was one minute).
58 Generally, cardiopulmonary resuscitation
is a combination of rescue breathing and chest compressions delivered
to victims thought to be in cardiac arrest. When cardiac arrest occurs,
the heart stops pumping blood. CPR can support a small amount of
blood flow to the heart and brain to “buy time” until normal heart
function is restored.
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanheart
.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=4479 (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (accessed by searching for
the URL in the Internet Archive).
59 If a physician begins CPR on a non-DNR patient who began cardiac arrest less than five
minutes prior, however, there is a chance he will be revived. Harrington, supra note 1, at 354
(describing how “many patients can be successfully resuscitated after this short an interval”).
60 Id. at 354.
61 See id. at 358.
62 Id. at 354.
990 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:981
Most states, consistent with the IOM, adopt the first two constructions of the
term “irreversible”; therefore, they have statutes that both facilitate organ donation
procedures and ensure that organ donors will not be operated on if they have a
chance of revival.63 In addition, these states respect donors’ wishes not to be resusci-
tated by beginning the harvesting process before the point at which artificial resusci-
tation would be ineffective.
B. Virginia’s Process, and Another Outlier
Similar to all other states, Virginia permits a declaration of death upon either
whole brain or cardiac death.64 For cardiac death, however, a physician must deter-
mine that “there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and spontaneous cardiac
functions and . . . attempts at resuscitation would not, in the opinion of such physician,
be successful in restoring spontaneous life-sustaining functions.”65 While most states
respect a patient’s last wish to refuse artificial life-sustaining measures, Virginia ap-
pears to adopt the Institute of Medicine’s third construction of “irreversible.”66 This
suggests that a patient who wishes to donate his organs and who has entered a DNR
order cannot be declared “dead” for purposes of organ donation until his doctor de-
termines that artificial resuscitation attempts would not be successful. The definition
thus disregards a patient’s DNR order by incorporating artificial resuscitation into
the calculus for determining when death occurs, delaying the call of death for five
or more minutes.67 This flies in the face of logic and self-determination as well as
the Supreme Court’s recognition of an individual’s right to die by “refusing un-
wanted medical treatment.”68
Virginia is not alone, however, in its treatment of this issue. Oklahoma’s death sta-
tute also has a unique interpretation of the term “irreversible.” Oklahoma requires that
“all reasonable attempts to restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory functions
63 See id. (describing how only “a few states favor a strict construction of irreversible in
their death statutes”).
64 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (A)(1)–(2) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
65 Id. at § 54.1-2972(A)(1).
66 Id. (requiring that physicians opine that attempts at resuscitation would not be “successful
in restoring spontaneous life-sustaining functions before declaring death”); see also supra
note 60 and accompanying text.
67 Debate exists regarding the point at which one could firmly establish that artificial re-
suscitation would no longer revive a patient in asystole. Assuming an individual’s brain must
have ceased functioning for him to be declared dead, this point may be ten or fifteen minutes
after asystole. James M. DuBois, Is Organ Procurement Causing the Death of Patients?, 18
ISSUES L. & MED. 21, 34 (2002) (citing Joanne Lynn, Are the Patients Who Become Organ
Donors Under the Pittsburgh Protocol for “Non-Heart-Beating Donors” Really Dead?, 3
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 167, 170 (1993)).
68 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (inferring this right
from the Fourteenth Amendment based on previous cases).
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shall first be made, prior to [a death] declaration.”69 This is even stricter than Virginia’s
statute, which only requires a determination that CPR would not be effective.70 In
Oklahoma, the statute on its face requires reasonable attempts at CPR.71
Though not the sole instance of departure from the norm, Virginia’s death sta-
tute is still an outlier ripe for constitutional analysis. The critical distinguishing fea-
ture of the Commonwealth’s law is the inclusion of CPR in the death determination.
Admittedly, in most instances, this consideration is meaningless. For example, if a
non-donor suffers cardiac arrest while in the hospital and has an effective and unam-
biguous DNR order, physicians will likely refrain from performing CPR and allow the
patient to die peacefully.72 As soon as it becomes clear that this patient’s heart has ac-
tually stopped and the lack of beat is not from an irregular rhythm, death is certain.73
It is of no consequence that the patient’s brain may still be flickering for another ten
or fifteen minutes; the patient has expressed his wish to refuse artificial life-sustaining
measures.74 In this respect, Virginia’s law requiring doctors to wait to call time of death
until after they determine that no efforts at CPR would be effective is of little value.
The patient’s family will accept the cessation of the heartbeat as the end of their loved
one’s life, and it is inconsequential that the doctor has to report the death minutes
after auto-resuscitation would have been impossible.
Virginia’s law does become an issue, however, when time of death is pivotal, as
with regard to organ donation.75 Organ donors have expressly communicated their
desire not only to donate their organs, but in many instances to avoid being sub-
jected to artificial resuscitative efforts. Because such donors have stated that they do
not wish to undergo CPR, the effects of CPR should not be criteria for determining
whether donors are “dead” for purposes of organ procurement.76 This implicates a
69 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 3122(2) (West 2011).
70 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972(A)(1) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
71 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 3122(2).
72 See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987.1(B) (providing that “[i]n no case shall any person
other than the patient have authority to revoke a Durable Do Not Resuscitate Order executed
upon the request of and with the consent of the patient himself”).
73 The individual has a DNR order in place; revival efforts will not be attempted.
74 See generally Bernat, supra note 37.
75 Id. at 671 (stating that “the sooner death can be declared after asystole, the less damage
from warm ischemia will occur in the organs”); HERDMAN & POTTS, supra note 25, at 26
(listing “a prompt determination of death and organ retrieval” as a “favorable condition[ ]” of
a donor).
76 There are no statistics available to quantify empirically the harmful effect of Virginia’s
law on organ donation. No figure exists that represents the number of transplants foregone
due to deterioration of post-maturely harvested organs; similarly, there is no statistic showing
what percentage of potential organ donors on life support actually become donors of viable,
transplantable organs in Virginia as compared with other states. This being said, from 2006
to 2010, Virginia had 673 deceased donors from whom organs were recovered. Donors
Recovered in the U.S. for Virginia, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/viewDataReports.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
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variety of constitutional issues, including privacy, death, and an individual’s au-
thority to determine the effects on his own body.77 Americans would find foreign the
notion that unwelcome invasions of their bodies are permissible. In the same vein,
society has faith that medical professionals will respect DNR orders, written convey-
ances of the will of a patient.78 “Because controlled donors choose to be withdrawn
from life support and it would be unethical, if not legally wrong, to resuscitate these
individuals, it is acceptable to construe irreversibility to mean that we will not reverse,
not that we cannot reverse, circulatory functions.”79 This ethical dilemma is the subject
of this Note’s due process analysis.
Virginia is part of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network’s Region 11, which also
includes North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee. OPTN Regions/Members,
ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov
/members/regions.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). Region 11, in this same time period, saw
4,685 deceased donors from whom organs were recovered. OPTN Donors Recovered in the
U.S. for Region 11, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn
.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/rptData.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). Virginia’s contribution
represents just over fourteen percent. Compare this to the states’ respective populations: in
2010, the population of Virginia was 8,001,024. Virginia Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51000.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). The same
year, the population of Region 11 was 32,847,343. See Kentucky QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2012);
North Carolina QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states
/37000.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2012); South Carolina QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/45000.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2012); Tennessee
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/47000.html (last
visited Mar. 15, 2012); Virginia Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census
.gov/qfd/states/51000.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). Virginia comprises almost one quarter
of the population of Region 11, but only fourteen percent of deceased donors from whom
organs were harvested. Though there are other variables that may explain these percentages
(such as higher or lower donor proportions within populations), these statistics suggest that
Virginia falls behind her peers in producing recoverable organs.
77 See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), rev’d on other
grounds, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957) (stating that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body”).
78 The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990 requires that hospitals provide patients
with written materials related to advance directives and patient wishes. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388-115 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1995) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f)(A)). These materials must explain to patients
their decision-making rights. Id. at § 1395cc(A)(i); see also CODE OF MED. ETHICS OP. 2.20,
AM. MED. ASS’N, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical
-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion220.shtml (stating that physicians must “respect the de-
cision to forgo life-sustaining treatment of a patient who possesses decision-making capacity”);
CODE OF MED. ETHICS OP. 2.22, AM. MED. ASS’N, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama
/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion222.shtml (stating that
“advance directives stating patients’ refusals of CPR should be honored”).
79 Harrington, supra note 1, at 356–57.
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III. DUE PROCESS
Fundamental rights are those that are afforded special protection under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.80 Rights are granted this fundamental
status when they are explicitly or implicitly identified in the Constitution.81 The vio-
lation of such rights creates a constitutional issue of substantive due process.82
Curtailing fundamental rights is permissible, but it requires a strict scrutiny
review of the law allegedly infringing on that right.83 In United States v. Carolene
Products Co.,84 the Court stated that laws that implicate constitutional protections
should not be presumed to be constitutional.85 A “‘more searching judicial inquiry’ is
appropriate when . . . a law . . . interferes with individual rights.”86 To pass this more
intense review, a law must satisfy three requirements. First, the law must be justified
by a compelling state interest.87 “The decisions of [the Supreme] Court have consis-
tently held that only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject . . . can
justify limiting . . . freedoms.”88 Second, it must be narrowly tailored.89 And third,
80 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 792 (3d ed.
2006) (“The Supreme Court has held that some liberties are so important that they are
deemed to be ‘fundamental rights’. . . . Almost all of these rights have been protected by the
Court under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.”).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 546 (“Substantive due process . . . asks whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property.”).
83 Id. at 539 (“If it is an area where there is reason for great suspicion of the government
or a fundamental right is at stake, the government will be required, by the level of scrutiny,
to meet a heavy burden.”).
84 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
85 Id. at 152 n.4 (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution.”).
86 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 540 (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
87 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that
racial classifications, which are an infringement of the fundamental right of equal protection,
are only constitutional if they are “narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that an
unemployment compensation statute was unconstitutional because there was no compel-
ling state interest that justified “the substantial infringement of [the] appellant’s First
Amendment rights”).
88 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
89 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (“Under strict
scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the State’s asserted purpose must be specifically
and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.”); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
480 (1980) (recognizing “the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure that” any infringe-
ment of equal protection, a fundamental right, “is narrowly tailored to the achievement” of
its goals).
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the law must be the least restrictive means to meet the state’s justified ends.90 Only
when the government has met the burden91 of demonstrating these criteria can the
right-infringing legislation be deemed constitutional.92
Privacy and death are two rights familiar to the Court and the American people.
They have undergone the fundamental rights analysis in different contexts, and can
be applied to the present issue of Virginia’s declaration of death statute.
A. Right to Privacy
1. Privacy as a Fundamental Right
Though the Constitution does not expressly mention the right to privacy, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is constitutionally protected.93 In Griswold
v. Connecticut,94 the Court affirmed the privacy right of married couples to use con-
traceptive products.95 Eisenstadt v. Baird96 also endorsed the right to privacy as to
contraception.97 The Court in Lawrence v. Texas98 ruled that intimate same-sex re-
lations are also protected by the right to privacy.99 Loving v. Virginia100 established
90 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)
(“The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty, ‘a fundamental right,’ by showing that
it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.”).
91 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 217 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that the State “unquestionably bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that its” dep-
rivation of specific fundamental rights “is necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest”).
92 See supra notes 87, 89–90.
93 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990).
94 381 U.S. 479.
95 See id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (reaffirming the Court’s holding that
Connecticut’s ban on the use of contraceptives “unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right
to marital privacy”).
96 405 U.S. 438.
97 Id. at 453 (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
98 539 U.S. 558.
99 Id. (holding that the “Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex
to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional, as applied to adult males
who had engaged in a consensual act of sodomy in the privacy of their home”).
100 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“The right
to marry is part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.”).
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the right to privacy in selecting a spouse.101 Most famously, the Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade102 grounded the decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy in pri-
vacy rights.103 Most on point as to the present issue, Cruzan v. Director of Missouri
Department of Health104 upheld the right to privacy in refusing medical treatment.105
The Bill of Rights creates auxiliary privacy rights in addition to those rights spe-
cifically granted.106 For example, even though the First Amendment does not mention
prerogatives like parental choice with regard to their children’s education or study of
specific foreign languages, the Supreme Court has held that it includes both.107 These
“penumbras” of Bill of Rights privacy guarantees generate broad “zones of privacy”
for American citizens.108 The right to privacy in deciding what to do with one’s body,
as in timely organ donation, surely sits in the shadows of the expressed rights protect-
ing citizens from oppressive government intervention. As Justice Goldberg wrote in
his Griswold concurrence: “[T]he concept of liberty protects those personal rights that
are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights.”109
In addition to these more specific aspects of privacy, the Supreme Court has
declared that there is a general right to privacy found in both the Ninth110 and
Fourteenth111 Amendments to the Constitution.112 The Ninth Amendment guards
101 Id. at 12 (offering that the “Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice
to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination”).
102 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103 Id. at 153 (declaring that the constitutional “right of privacy . . . is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”).
104 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
105 Id. at 278 (inferring “[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment”).
106 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citing cases that “suggest that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance”).
107 Id. at 482 (discussing the rights upheld in Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), which are “the right to educate one’s
children as one chooses” and “the right to study the German language in a private school”).
108 Id. at 484.
109 Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
110 “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
111 No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-
ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
112 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (describing how “the Ninth
Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution’s authors that fundamental rights exist that
are not expressly enumerated”); id. at 493 (describing how the “Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the States . . . from abridging fundamental personal liberties”).
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against the possibility that an express mention of certain rights would lead to the
belief that all others are excluded.113 In his concurrence in Griswold, Justice Goldberg
stated: “The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers
of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected
from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights spe-
cifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments.”114 Justice Goldberg
further explained that James Madison, the author of the amendment, was afraid of
listing specific rights, thereby denying rights that went unmentioned.115 Madison was
not the only Founder concerned with protecting the unenumerated rights of Americans.
Alexander Hamilton believed the Bill of Rights’ enumeration of liberties would be
superfluous, since the government did not possess powers that were not explicitly
delegated to it.116 The Ninth Amendment was included, just in case, to ensure the
preservation of unwritten liberties.117 Thus, though privacy is not mentioned by
name, it is not without protection.
The Fourteenth Amendment decrees that no State shall “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”118 The nation’s Founders were
clearly concerned with the preservation of liberties not explicitly set forth in the
Constitution.119 In Griswold, Justice Goldberg showed that the Court views the
Fourteenth Amendment as guaranteeing a broad privacy right.120 Justice Harlan, in
his concurrence in the same case, expressed that the Fourteenth Amendment is “on
its own bottom,” meaning that it in itself protects individuals from encroachments
on privacy.121 Other cases have also determined that privacy is an elemental compo-
nent of liberty. The Lawrence Court ruled that a law regulating private conduct was
unconstitutional.122 The opinion stated that the “[p]etitioners’ right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause g[ave] them the full right to engage in private conduct with-
out government intervention.”123 Similarly, as the Court stated in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,124 “It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal lib-
erty which the government may not enter.”125 The right to privacy, therefore, has much
broad support in Supreme Court history.
113 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
114 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
115 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488–89 (describing how “the specific mention of certain rights
would be interpreted as a denial that others were protected”).
116 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
117 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488–89.
118 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
119 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488–89.
120 See id. at 488, 493.
121 Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
122 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
123 Id. at 560.
124 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
125 Id. at 847.
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2. Privacy in Organ Donation
Though privacy is generally deemed a right of fundamental importance,126 not
every aspect of privacy may qualify for this elevated status.127 At issue in this par-
ticular case is an individual’s wish to be removed from artificial life-sustaining tech-
nologies with the supplementary, yet independent, purpose of donating his organs
in mind. At the critical juncture, this individual is not brain dead, but he has suffered
cardiac arrest and is kept alive by a mechanical ventilator. Though all or part of his
brain is functioning, it will die approximately ten to fifteen minutes after life support
systems are removed.128 The potential donor has entered a DNR order and indicated
he would like to give his organs as gifts.129
Individuals in such situations assert the broad right to self-definition. Not only do
they seek to define their lives, they also aim to define their deaths. They have entered
DNR orders and do not wish to be sustained by artificial means. The Supreme Court
in Lawrence upheld as fundamental the right to self-definition.130 The Court has further
recognized this as a basic privacy right.131 The Cruzan Court made a similar ruling,
holding that “the right to self-determination ordinarily outweighs any countervailing
state interests, and competent persons generally are permitted to refuse medical
treatment, even at the risk of death.”132 Bodily integrity is also of great importance.133
In Virginia, this potential organ donor is subject to the statutory codification
governing death determination.134 His organs cannot be harvested until he has passed
126 See supra Part III.A.1.
127 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (holding that women do not have the right
to terminate pregnancy after the first trimester, and that “after this point, a State may regulate
the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation
and protection of maternal health”).
128 DEFINING DEATH, supra note 28, at 16–17 (“If deprived of blood flow for at least
10–15 minutes, the brain, including the brainstem, will completely cease functioning.”).
129 Nearly every American jurisdiction has a statutory provision allowing individuals to
predetermine their end-of-life treatment through advance directives and living wills. Adam A.
Milani, Better Off Dead Than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a “Wrongful Living”
Cause of Action When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients’ Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 149, 159 (1997); see UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(b) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 1
(2003) (requiring that anatomical gifts be made by written documents); see also John Donohue,
“Wrongful Living”: Recovery for a Physician’s Infringement on an Individual’s Right to Die,
14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 391, 397 n.27 (listing the statutes for the forty-four states
that codify living will laws).
130 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (stating that “[l]iberty presumes an auton-
omy of self”).
131 See supra Part III.A.1.
132 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 273 (1990).
133 Id. at 269 (“[N]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the com-
mon law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person.”
(quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891))).
134 See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972(A)(1) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
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the point, temporally, when artificial resuscitation would be ineffective.135 This is
later than the time at which auto-resuscitation would no longer be possible.136 This
state-imposed delay for declaring the intended donor deceased disturbs his right to
self-definition, bodily control, and privacy.
The degree to which a right must be protected depends on whether it is deeply
rooted in history and tradition and/or implicit in ordered liberty.137 The Fourteenth
Amendment actively protects rights “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”138 The first question is thus whether the
liberty invoked here “is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating
those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions.’”139 The exact intentions of an individual seeking a
timely death declaration do not have a firm footing in historical convention, but this
should not affect adversely a potential donor because his predicament is a fairly mod-
ern one.140 Similar liberties have been deemed fundamental in the past.141 Most sig-
nificant is the right to refuse medical treatment, established as a fundamental right in
Cruzan.142 The present analysis parallels that of refusing life-saving medical treat-
ment because the situation involves a determination of death dependent on whether
life-saving treatment would be successful. Thus, a history of eschewing resuscitative
measures at the patient’s request is apparent.
Certainly, organ donors intend for their organs to be transplanted successfully
into needy recipients, or at least that best efforts be made.143 Short of disrupting their
own comfort, they seek to ensure that the donation procedure progresses as safely and
135 Id.
136 See supra note 67.
137 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (“We begin, as we do in all due
process cases, by examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.”); see also
Bret D. Asbery, Law as Palimpsest: Conceptualizing Contingency in Judicial Opinions, 61
ALA. L. REV. 121, 139 (2009) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191–92 (1986)).
138 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (citations omitted).
139 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312, 316 (1926)).
140 Robert Steinbrook, Organ Donation after Cardiac Death, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 209,
212 (2007), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp078066 (describing
how the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization’s “first accreditation
standard for donation after cardiac death” did not arise until 2007).
141 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (establishing the
right to remove life-sustaining treatment); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir.
1991) (granting a woman a possessory interest—but not full property rights—in the body of
her deceased husband when the state made organ donation decisions without her consent).
142 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
143 Organ donation in the United States is voluntary. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT
§ 2(a) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 27 (2003) (noting that individuals may refuse to make anatomical
gifts); Uniform Anatomical Gift Act Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical Gift Act (2006) (last visited Mar. 15, 2012)
(listing Virginia as a state that has enacted the Act).
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efficiently as possible. This expectation is apparent from a donor’s voluntary decision
to be classified as an organ donor.144 Though it is safe to assume that most soon-to-
be donors anticipate a reasonable amount of precaution to ensure permanent death,
it is unreasonable to argue that they anticipate CPR—something they have expressly
declined—will constitute part of the death calculus. An approach such as Virginia’s,
which interferes with organ donation in this manner, is contrary to the American tra-
dition of respecting the dying individual’s final requests.145
Additionally, an intended donor’s right to a death determination independent of
resuscitative efforts is fundamental to the concept of liberty itself. Individuals who
elect to forego resuscitative attempts and donate organs should not have their deaths
based on when such attempts would be unsuccessful. Although no one can have full
property rights in organs,146 those on their deathbed are entitled to dictate what they
wish to be done with their bodies.147 Additionally, next of kin of the deceased have
at least a possessory interest in the corpse, which should enable them to ensure that
donation occurs as the deceased desired.148 In a free society where Good Samaritans
are willing to subject their bodies to post-mortem mutilation, these Samaritans’ ex-
pectations should be met. The State should not deceive them into thinking a hospital
will make its best efforts to conduct a successful, safe transplantation when laws
prohibit this. If these individuals knew the odds were not as high as possible,149 they
might choose to rethink the post-mortem mutilation. This is especially true for in-
dividuals who elect to be organ donors in a majority rule-conforming state and face
a declaration of death in a state like Virginia.
144 See supra note 143.
145 See Frances H. Foster, Individualized Justice in Disputes Over Dead Bodies, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1351, 1376–79 (2008) (listing many “instruments to promote a decedent’s control
over her remains”).
146 See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488 (Cal. 1990) (holding that an
individual does not necessarily have property rights to his cells after their removal from
his body).
147 See Foster, supra note 145, at 1376–78.
148 Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that “[a] majority
of the courts confronted with the issue of whether a property interest can exist in a dead body
have found that a property right of some kind does exist and often refer to it as a ‘quasi-
property right,’” and noting that this includes preparation for burial); Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., 186 A. 585, 586 (N.J. 1936) (“[I]t is now the prevailing rule, in England as
well as in this country, that the right to bury the dead and preserve the remains is a quasi right
in property.”). But see State v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1986), in which family members
did not want the decedent’s corneas removed, but the coroner removed them anyway. Id. at
1188. Family members asserted a fundamental right to control the disposition of the deceased’s
body, but the court held that privacy provisions do not protect such an intrusion into one’s
private life. Id. at 1193.
149 See Harrington, supra note 1, at 338 (“The speed with which a diagnosis of death is
made in the DCD context is done solely to facilitate organ procurement. The closer the donor
is to life, the more useful the organs will be to the recipient.”).
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A solid case is thus presented for designating a timely death determination a fun-
damental right. Virginia would argue that both prongs—history/tradition and implicit
in ordered liberty—must be satisfied,150 and it appears that the organ donor would pre-
vail on this point. To enact a regulation that infringes upon a fundamental right such
as this, a State must demonstrate a compelling interest in the effect of the legislation.
3. Compelling Interest
Generally, privacy is a fundamental right.151 This does not mean that all conceptions
of privacy are constitutionally protected.152 In some instances, the State has a sufficient
interest in regulating an activity, such that it may deprive an individual of his or her
right to privacy.153 A thorough due process analysis weighs a state’s compelling inter-
est against the right in question to determine whether the government can legally in-
fringe upon privacy in a given domain.
Assuming the privacy right to die peacefully without artificial attempts at resus-
citation and to donate organs is a fundamental right, a state must show a compelling
interest in compromising this right. “Once a court determines that a privacy right exists,
the court next must determine whether ‘[abrogation of the right] serves a compelling
state interest’ and whether ‘[abrogation] can be made in the least intrusive manner.’”154
The question is whether an individual’s right to privacy and self-definition in organ do-
nation trumps the State’s interest in protecting his health and adhering to other laws.
Very broadly, Virginia’s interests include “preservation of life, the protection of the
interests of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the maintenance of
the ethical integrity of the medical profession,” though the first is most important.155
It appears that the Commonwealth is concerned that vital organs may be har-
vested before a donor is actually dead, in violation of the dead donor rule.156 The
Commonwealth may also deem it imperative to ensure that no further attempts at
resuscitation would succeed before engaging in a surgery that would kill an indi-
vidual not already dead. This is the primary conflict to be resolved in this analysis.
The potential donor seeks a death determination that reflects his expressed wishes
to refuse medical treatment; the State aims to protect his life and those of others in his
150 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
151 See supra Part III.A.1.
152 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727 (stating that merely because “many of the rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant
the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so
protected”); supra Part III.A.2.
153 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (stating, “[w]here there is a significant
encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordi-
nating interest which is compelling”).
154 Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1126 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
155 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990).
156 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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situation while ensuring that physicians do not violate the ethical responsibilities of
their profession.157
Another state interest is the protection of “vulnerable groups.”158 Victims of car-
diac arrest, unconscious and on the verge of death, can confidently be classified as
vulnerable.159 Protecting these individuals from abuse is a legitimate state interest.160
Although the physician who calls a patient’s time of death must not be the physician
who removes or transplants his organs,161 competent medical professionals may have
an interest in increasing organ donation rates, especially if they frequently care for
other patients in need of organs. If a physician were permitted to call time of death
earlier than the point at which it is physically impossible for a patient to be revived
by any means, the practice could become fertile ground for abuse. The State here is
reasonably interested in protecting the patient-victim.
Despite these legitimate interests, Virginia’s determination of death statute is
not the least restrictive way to accomplish its objectives.162 This is apparent when one
examines the criteria other states use to determine time of death.163 Virginia could sat-
isfy its goal of preserving life by adopting this prevalent standard. Once it is deter-
mined that an individual will not auto-resuscitate, and he also will not be treated with
CPR, death is permanent. If Virginia accepts this as the time of death standard, it will
succeed in both preserving life and allowing intended donors to maintain their pri-
vacy and self-definition. Further it will be sufficient to protect against internal abuses
that may arise. Because this is a less restrictive means of achieving the preservation
of life, Virginia’s compelling interest for prolonging the status quo does not out-
weigh the patients’ fundamental rights.
4. Constitutionality
The above due process analysis reveals that Virginia’s death-determination stat-
ute may seriously infringe fundamental privacy rights. While there may not exist a
true privacy right in having one’s death declared at a certain time, Virginia’s statute
157 The Hippocratic Oath requires doctors to help patients, not end their lives. See Peter
Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, PBS (Mar. 27, 2001), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova
/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html. 
158 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (identifying the “poor, elderly,
and disabled” as “vulnerable groups”; the latter two often comprise a significant portion of
DCD donors).
159 See id.
160 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261 (stating that a “State is entitled to guard against potential
abuses” of patients unable to make their own decisions).
161 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(b) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 58 (2003) (“[N]either the
physician . . . who attends the donor at death nor the physician . . . who determines the time
of death may participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part.”).
162 See supra notes 89–91 (citing cases articulating the Court’s requirement that reg-
ulations that infringe on fundamental rights be narrowly tailored).
163 See Harrington, supra note 1, at 354–55.
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encroaches on more than this. Death is declared for legal and record-keeping
purposes. Deeming an individual “living” for a few minutes after he has passed
away is not an infringement of a personal liberty; his body is not desecrated or
disrespected. In fact, people are not declared dead until a medical professional calls
the time of death. When individuals die in their homes, in many cases they are dead
long before a doctor arrives and calls the time of death. This in itself does not violate
a privacy right. The implications of the law are what stifle the right to privacy. These
implications include loss of self-definition and the inability to proceed with organ
donation in the most effective and safe manner possible.164
Although Virginia’s statute would pass a rational basis review test165—avoiding
the harvesting of organs from living human beings is a legitimate state interest that
would warrant infringement upon a non-fundamental right—the Commonwealth
cannot establish the compelling interest and narrow tailoring required to justify the
intrusion into personal privacy. For the reasons described above, Virginia’s statute
is at odds with the Constitution of the United States.
B. Right to Die
1. Death as a Fundamental Right
In American jurisprudence, the right to death comprises a broad category of
various interrelated personal liberties.166 Included are the right to death itself, the
right to define the manner of one’s own death, and the right to refuse means that will
prolong life.167 These have been subjects of national discussion and venerated by
individuals claiming them as fundamental rights.168 States’ interests in preserving
life, however, are often directly at odds with these rights.169 The Supreme Court has
issued rulings on these questions with varying degrees of clarity.170
164 See supra Part II.B.
165 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (explaining that
a law “is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless . . . it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators”).
166 See generally Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (stating that it cannot be denied that states have an “interest
in the protection and preservation of human life”).
170 See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808–09 (holding that states are permitted to prohibit physician-
assisted suicide); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705–06 (holding that individuals do not have the
right to physician-assisted suicide); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 262 (holding that individuals have
the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment).
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The right to death has most recently been contemplated with respect to the right
to physician-assisted suicide.171 Terminally ill, competent, adult patients172 some-
times claim that they have the right to take their own lives in a humane manner.173
This often requires the assistance of medical professionals. The rights alleged in
such cases are typically a liberty interest in determining the “‘manner of one’s own
death,’ . . . a ‘liberty to choose how to die,’ [and] a right to ‘control one’s final
days.’”174 The Supreme Court has considered these in several cases.175
In Vacco v. Quill,176 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of physician-assisted
suicide, though the case was more of an equal protection inquiry, not a fundamental
right determination.177 It ruled that New York did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause178 in allowing terminally ill patients to end their lives by withdrawing life-
sustaining equipment even though it did not permit other terminally ill patients to
end their lives by participating in physician-assisted suicide.179 Physicians who cared
for terminally ill patients agreed the discrepancy seemed to treat patients different-
ly based on whether they were using life-support machines.180 The Vacco Court
ruled, however, that there was no equal protection violation because all persons are
171 See generally Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
172 Oregon, one of the three states that explicitly makes assisted suicide legal, governs it
very strictly:
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been deter-
mined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be suf-
fering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his
or her wish to die, may make a written request for medication for the
purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.
Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.805 (2.01) (2011). The statute
defines “terminal disease” to mean “an incurable and irreversible disease that . . . will . . .
produce death within six months.” Id. at § 127.800 (1.01).
173 Patients in Montana, Oregon, and Washington elect to terminate their lives every year.
In Oregon, there were sixty-five physician-assisted suicides in 2010. OREGON PUBLIC HEALTH
DIVISION, OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT ANNUAL REPORT (2010), http://www.oregon
.gov/DHS/ph/pas/. At least thirty-six patients in Washington elected physician-assisted suicide
that same year. William Yardley, Report Finds 36 Died Under Assisted Suicide Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/us/05suicide.html. Montana does
not have statistics yet because assisted suicide just became legal in late 2009. See Kirk
Johnson, Montana Ruling Bolsters Doctor-Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01suicide.html.
174 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 703.
175 See generally Vacco, 521 U.S. 793; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
176 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
177 Id. at 793.
178 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.”).
179 Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808–09.
180 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the disparities in access
to death violated equal protection), overruled by Vacco, 521 U.S. 793.
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afforded the same opportunities: everyone is permitted to refuse treatment, and no
one is permitted to receive help from a physician in committing a suicide.181
Unfortunately, the more relevant issue—the legality of euthanasia—did not re-
ceive the same limelight as the Equal Protection inquiry. The Vacco Court did not
address whether terminally ill, competent individuals have the right to a physician’s
assistance in committing suicide.182 The Court never held, therefore, that there is no
right to death,183 preserving the issue for future analysis.
Washington v. Glucksberg, Vacco’s companion case, targeted the “right to death”
issue more narrowly.184 The question the Court sought to answer was “whether the
‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”185 Though plaintiffs
convinced the district186 and circuit187 courts that the right to die by suicide with the
help of a physician is a fundamental right, the Supreme Court did not find this con-
cept consistent with the United States’s history and traditions.188 Therefore, the Court
found no right to physician-assisted suicide, and thus no absolute right to die.189
The possibility of a right to assistance in suicide, however, is not foreclosed
entirely. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in Glucksberg, discerned that “some
applications of the [assisted suicide ban] may impose an intolerable intrusion on
the patient’s freedom.”190 Though Stevens believed the facts of the Glucksberg and
Vacco cases did not warrant a right to assisted suicide, he wrote that different
circumstances might.191 Specifically, he noted that the state interest in preserving
life “is not itself sufficient to outweigh the interest in liberty that may justify the
only possible means of preserving a dying patient’s dignity and alleviating her in-
tolerable suffering.”192 Therefore, the right to physician-assisted suicide for patients
meeting certain qualifications cannot be dismissed entirely. In fact, Washington has
since legalized physician-assisted suicide.193
181 Vacco, 521 U.S. at 800.
182 See generally id., 521 U.S. at 793.
183 Id.
184 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (describing how the interest at
stake must be carefully formulated).
185 Id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
186 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
overruled by Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
187 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled by
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
188 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710 (stating that “an examination of our Nation’s history, legal
traditions, and practices demonstrates that Anglo-American common law has punished or
otherwise disapproved of assisting suicide for over 700 years”); see also id. at 710–19.
189 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702.
190 Id. at 751–52 (Stevens, J., concurring).
191 Id. at 752.
192 Id.
193 Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.040 (2011).
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The right to refuse medical treatment, and thus to be allowed to die, also fits
the broad “right to death” category. Unlike the denial of a fundamental liberty in-
terest in assisted suicide,194 the Supreme Court has explicitly declared the refusal
of life-sustaining medical treatment a fundamental right under the United States
Constitution.195 In Cruzan, the Supreme Court used previous decisions as guides to
determine that a “competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment.”196 Withdrawing life support and passively
allowing natural events to occur is distinct from actively causing an individual to
die.197 This is how Glucksberg and Vacco distinguished the physician-assisted sui-
cide issue from the passive death issue in Cruzan.198
Complementary to both the right to refuse medical treatment and the right to die
is the claimed right to determine the manner of one’s own death. The appellate court
in Glucksberg found such a right in Casey and Cruzan.199 Although this does not ap-
ply authoritatively to the present case, it demonstrates an additional application of
the liberties inherent in an overarching right to death.
The Supreme Court has deemed fundamental several aspects of the liberty
interest in ending one’s own life. Though not embraced to the furthest reaches of
the imagination, the Court is willing to protect an individual’s right to die in cer-
tain circumstances.200
2. Death in Organ Donation
The right to death and its corresponding liberties play an important role in the
examination of the constitutionality of Virginia’s death-determination law. The law
requires that, prior to declaring that an individual is dead, it must be of the physician’s
opinion that the patient could not be resuscitated with CPR.201 In determining when
the individual in question is deceased, Virginia’s statute also determines when he
no longer has the rights of a United States citizen.202 For this reason, the question of
194 See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
195 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
196 Id. at 278.
197 See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 798 (noting the difference between “allowing nature to take its
course” and “intentionally using an artificial death-producing device”).
198 Id., 521 U.S. at 801 (stating that “when a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment,
he dies from an underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication
prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication”).
199 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled by
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (stating that these cases “provide persuasive
evidence that the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time
and manner of one’s death—that there is, in short, a constitutionally recognized ‘right to die’”).
200 See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
201 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972(A)(1) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
202 See id.; see also Erik S. Jaffe, Note, “She’s Got Bette Davis[‘s] Eyes”: Assessing the
Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses,
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when an individual is pronounced dead is important. Though this has little impact
on the lives—and on the deaths—of most individuals, the Virginia law has weighty
ramifications when the dying individual has expressed wishes that are tied to and
dependent on the declaration of his death, such as organ donation.203
The specific “right” invoked in such a situation is not the right to be allowed to
die. Instead, it is the right to be pronounced dead when one is actually dead. This
falls into the same broad “right to death” category of personal liberties discussed in
the previous subsection. Though material controversy exists as to when an individual
can be said to have officially died,204 other states have been able to make determina-
tions more in harmony with the deceased’s interests than Virginia has been.205 The
question is whether, when an individual has issued a DNR order and enters cardiac
arrest, his death should be reckoned by the cessation of his vital signs without regard
to whether mechanical resuscitation would revive him. Because he has expressly
denied a desire to be resuscitated, it is his right to be declared dead without taking
the effects of CPR into account. Most states interpret the UDDA as providing exactly
this.206 A declaration of death at the moment cardiovascular function will not resume
is indeed a reasonable standard for pronouncing death.
The present question can be distinguished from that in Vacco v. Quill. In Vacco,
the Supreme Court made a distinction between the removal of life-sustaining treat-
ment and physician-assisted suicide.207 One factor they used to draw a line between
the two is the fact that, in the former, the physician is only stopping treatment the
patient no longer finds helpful.208 By contrast, in the latter, the doctor unnaturally
causes the patient to die.209 A declaration of death upon irreversible failure of cardio-
pulmonary function sans CPR criterion is akin to forgoing unwanted treatment. A phy-
sician who declares death when cardiopulmonary function irreversibly ceases without
regard to CPR is not intending for the patient to die; he is simply declaring the time
of death when it naturally occurs. This is far more similar to the protected practice of
refusing medical treatment than it is to physician-assisted suicide. Declaring death
when the patient would have wanted death to be declared does not cause or even
hasten death, as it did for the patients at issue in Vacco.210 Death occurs at the same
point, regardless of when the physician declares it formally.
90 COLUM. L. REV. 528 (1990) (discussing the relative rights of the living and deceased to
control access to their bodies).
203 Harvesting of organs for transplant must occur as quickly as possible to avoid dete-
rioration from warm ischemia. See supra notes 1, 15 and accompanying text.
204 Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 917–18.
205 Harrington, supra note 1, at 354–55.
206 Id.
207 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801 (1997).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 802.
210 Id. at 801.
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Additionally, individuals enter DNR orders because they do not wish to be
resuscitated; like those who refuse medical treatment, they wish to be left at peace
when their bodies can no longer naturally sustain them. Waiting to call time of death
until after a physician determines that CPR would be ineffective is contrary to the
patient’s interest in being left at peace.211 This intent theme also rings true with organ
donors, who intend to maximize the goodwill stemming from their gifts. A hospital-
ized organ donor who issues a DNR order intends to donate his organs in a manner
that will, in fact, maximize this goodwill.212 The patient does not intend for the phy-
sician to delay a donation, risking the quality of his organs, in order to declare that
CPR would not resuscitate him when he never intended for CPR to be performed
anyway. The patient would not “stand[ ] to benefit from” this determination that treat-
ment would no longer be effective.213 Like the physicians in Cruzan, Virginia phy-
sicians should be permitted to act in the patient’s best interests with the patient’s
intent in mind.
Furthermore, just because it is permissible to ban physician-assisted suicide
does not mean it must be banned. Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Glucksberg left
physician-assisted suicide open for a later determination that some instances may be
protected by right, but ruled that a state’s ban was not unconstitutional given the
facts of the case being considered.214 Thus, even if a more proximate death determi-
nation fit the analysis of Glucksberg, its legality deserves careful consideration. The
present situation much more strongly resembles the facts of Cruzan than Glucksberg;
in Cruzan, refusal of medical treatment was deemed a fundamental right.215 It is not
something to be left to decide later; the Court already made its decision. This dis-
tinction between killing oneself and removing artificial means of life support is
recognized by many courts216 and state legislatures.217
The present issue in many ways parallels the issue faced by the Justices in
Cruzan. The Cruzan Court held that a sick individual whose life is sustained by ma-
chines can terminate this treatment, even though it will necessarily result in death.218
211 The Court in Vacco stated that the right to refuse treatment, laid out in Cruzan, was
grounded “on well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted
touching.” Id. at 807 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990)).
212 In the United States, organ donation is an opt-in system; it requires consent of the donor.
See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(b) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 24 (2003) (“An anatomical gift
may be made only by a document of gift signed by the donor.”).
213 See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 801 (quoting Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 368
(1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass)).
214 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 751–52 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
215 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
216 Vacco, 521 U.S. at 803 (“[M]any courts . . . have carefully distinguished refusing life-
sustaining treatment from suicide.”).
217 Id. at 804–05 (stating that “the overwhelming majority of state legislatures” have made
such a distinction).
218 Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
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Applying this to the present issue, a DNR patient who experiences cardiac arrest in
Virginia may remain free of life-saving medical equipment and be allowed to expire.
A law that interferes with the patient’s ability to refuse life-saving treatment would
be unconstitutional.219 Accordingly, the Virginia law in question does not require or
even allow physicians to force life-sustaining treatments on patients.220 Instead, it
demands that physicians delay a death determination until after the window of time
when life-sustaining treatments would be effective elapses.221 The difficulty lies in
ascertaining whether this is similar enough to forcing life-sustaining treatments on
a patient against his will.
Full judicial scrutiny of the Virginia law mandates more than a comparison to
other cases; the law must survive history/tradition- and implicit-in-ordered-liberty
analyses.222 Similar to the results of this inquiry in the privacy subsection above,223 the
constitutionality of death statutes like Virginia’s is not well-established in American
jurisprudence. The return to DCD introduced new ethical and scientific questions into
the law;224 its absence in legal thought at present is thus warranted. No one has con-
sidered whether it violates a fundamental right if a state delays an organ donor’s deter-
mination of death based on the use of a procedure to which the deceased has indicated
an aversion. The two most relevant Supreme Court cases are Glucksberg and Cruzan.
In Glucksberg, the history and tradition analysis of physician-assisted suicide failed
because of the Western world’s contempt for suicide.225 Thus, the “right” to death
discussed in Glucksberg does not exist because it is death attained in an historically
illegal manner. The present issue—the right to be declared dead when one’s cardio-
pulmonary function will never be revived spontaneously—is distinct from claiming
a right to suicide. It is more akin to allowing natural consequences to take place. This
is more historically acceptable, and it is the right that was upheld in Cruzan.226
It is clear that removal of unwanted life-sustaining measures is a fundamental
right.227 Assistance in suicide, however, is—for the time being—not.228 A declaration
of death when one is no longer living falls somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.
In distinguishing Cruzan from Glucksberg, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the
cause of death of the individual asserting the liberty interest.229 When a DNR individual
219 See id.
220 See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972(A)(1) (2010 & Supp. 2011).
221 Id.
222 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (noting that all “due process cases”
begin “by examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices”).
223 See supra Part III.A.2.
224 See supra Part I.B.
225 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
226 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
227 Id.
228 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
229 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 (holding that the Constitution protects a right to refuse
medical treatment, not the right to end one’s own life); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797
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asserts the right to be declared dead when his body can no longer survive without
resuscitation, he is essentially asking that nothing be done to revive his dying body.
He is not asking for a doctor to assist or hasten his death. His right should be treated
more like that expressed in Cruzan than that in Glucksberg. The Supreme Court, if
confronted with such an issue, would likely rule that the DNR individual has a fun-
damental right to know his body will not be tampered with after cardiopulmonary
function is irreversibly lost. Whether the Court would extend this right to prohibit
physicians from using artificial resuscitation criteria in determining the cause of
death is beyond the scope of precedent, but it is arguable that it would. In so doing,
the Court would be pronouncing a new—and needed—fundamental right.
3. Compelling Interest
For Virginia’s declaration of death law to be constitutional, the Commonwealth
must have a compelling interest in infringing on the fundamental right to death.230
Of the frequently cited compelling interests, those applicable here include preser-
vation of life, protection of third parties, and upholding the integrity of the medical
profession.231 The legislative intent for this particular component of Virginia’s law
is not recorded. One might infer, however, that the legislature intended to protect
individuals from a premature declaration of death. Although not noted in legislative
reports or session minutes, requiring a procedure for determining death indicates a
desire to control and regulate when it occurs. Virginia wanted to ensure that death
is only declared when death has in fact occurred. Debate on the specified death-
determination procedure itself is not apparent from the legislative materials; the
ramifications of the terminology used may not have been intended. Despite the
uncertainty, it is safe to assume, at the very least, that Virginia seeks to protect life.
Spontaneous resuscitation after the cessation of cardiopulmonary functions is
very rare, but it is possible.232 Physicians are acting safely when they wait to declare
death until even machines could not resuscitate the patient. Though legislators might
not have drafted this law with a mind toward organ donation, it certainly seeks to
protect life in the organ donation context. Removing organs before a patient is dead
would certainly kill him. Furthermore, the dead donor rule requires that organ donors
be dead before vital organs are removed.233 The rule’s purpose is twofold: it protects
(1997) (noting the difference between “allowing nature to take its course” and “intentionally
using an artificial death-producing device”).
230 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are
involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
‘compelling state interest’”) (citations omitted).
231 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
232 See Bernat, supra note 37, at 671 (stating that the longest interval after which a human
auto-resuscitated was one minute).
233 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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the donor’s bodily integrity by not removing his organs while he is still alive, and pre-
vents the organ harvesting from causing the donor’s death.234 This justifies Virginia’s
interest in governing death determinations. In fact, the Supreme Court has deemed
health and safety compelling interests in the past.235
Virginia’s law also protects third parties. It eliminates the possibility that fami-
ly members might be told their loved one is dead only to see him revived later. But,
as described above, spontaneous resuscitation is a remote possibility.236 Most of
the time, delaying such a declaration does not negatively impact the deceased or his
family, as it is not often apparent whether cessation of cardiopulmonary function
is permanent or impermanent.237 In cases where the deceased is an organ donor,
however, the delay can be detrimental.238 It is hardly compelling for a state to enact
a law that, though admittedly in most situations will not provide any problems, may
interfere with the intent and wishes of a deceased individual. An alternative law
could provide the same benefits without the negative consequences.239
The final potential compelling interest Virginia could assert is the preservation
of the virtues of the medical profession. Most physicians abide by medical ethics,
swearing to “do no harm.”240 Injury to potential organ donors by premature harvesting,
as discussed above, constitutes harm. Virginia’s law, therefore, protects the integrity
of physicians by ensuring certain standards are met. This cuts both ways, however.
Physicians are also required to respect the autonomy of their patients, including their
end-of-life decisions.241 Furthermore, although the physician who declares the time
of death cannot be the same physician who has an interest in implanting the deceased’s
organs in another patient,242 the medical profession as a whole has an interest in sav-
ing lives through organ donation.243 Virginia’s death-determination law unnecessarily
234 Id.
235 See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271, 279–80.
236 See Bernat, supra note 37, at 671.
237 See supra Part II for a discussion of the debates regarding irreversibility of cardio-
pulmonary cessation.
238 See Harrington, supra note 1, at 340.
239 See supra text accompanying notes 55–63.
240 The principle of nonmaleficence asserts an obligation not to inflict harm
on others. In medical ethics it has been closely associated with the maxim
Primum non nocere: “Above all [or first] do no harm.” Health care pro-
fessionals frequently invoke this maxim. . . . [T]he Hippocratic Oath
clearly expresses an obligation of nonmaleficence.
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 113 (5th
ed. 2001) (first alteration in original).
241 See generally id. for a discussion of the principle of patient autonomy in medical ethics.
242 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(b) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 58 (2003) (barring conflicts
of interest by forbidding physicians from declaring death who have an interest in implanting
the organ).
243 See OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION, supra note 6, at 46 (describing the “widening gap be-
tween the supply of transplantable organs and the number of patients on the waiting list”).
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delays the call of death, which sacrifices the probability of organ donation success.
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the integrity of the medical profession is
injured by Virginia’s current law.
Even though Virginia’s interest may be compelling in at least one instance—
preservation of life—in order for it to abrogate the plausibly fundamental right to
an honest death declaration, the law must be the least restrictive way to accomplish
the state’s objective.244 Although it is certainly not the most restrictive,245 other
methods exist—and are quite popular—for realizing state health objectives without
interfering as heavily with personal liberties.246 The law therefore fails the compelling
interest component of the due process analysis.
4. Constitutionality
Virginia’s law compromises a form of the fundamental right to death; as such,
the Commonwealth must have a compelling reason to justify it. Though Virginia has
a strong interest in the preservation of life, and this is a sufficiently compelling reason,
the law Virginia enacted is not the least restrictive way to achieve this objective.
The Institute of Medicine’s interpretation of the UDDA embraces the states’
interests in the preservation of life and the safety of the patient, but it is more nar-
rowly tailored.247 It also provides for the rights of the deceased individual.248 Perhaps
this is why most states adhere to some version of its test.249 Removing CPR from the
analysis of when a DNR individual is dead satisfies both state and citizen interests.
Additionally, it provides for increased uniformity, which enhances the function of
such a rule, ensuring predictability and consistency. Virginia’s law, based on this
analysis, is unconstitutional.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Joining the Majority
Virginia should modify its death-determination statute to conform with those of
the majority of states.250 For DNR patients, “irreversible” death should mean that a
patient will not spontaneously resuscitate. Legislation should be drafted that would
244 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (stating that when fundamental rights are
involved, “legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake”).
245 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 2011) (requiring that a physician unsuc-
cessfully attempt to resuscitate a patient in cardiac arrest before declaring death).
246 See Harrington, supra note 1, at 354; see also supra Part II.A.
247 See supra Part II.A–B.
248 See supra Part II.A.
249 See supra Part II.A.
250 See supra Part II.A.
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nullify Virginia’s current death-determination criteria and use language that does not
consider the effectiveness of artificial resuscitation when a patient has expressly re-
jected that course of treatment.
B. Public Policy
In addition to the unconstitutionality of Virginia’s current law, many policy
reasons also dictate a change in the statute. Such rationales include a tradition of
respecting the deceased’s wishes, uniformity, maintaining consent when patients die
in states other than their own, and increasing the benefit to society by providing for
more possible organ donations.
In the United States, most people have a strong respect for the deceased.251
Although no property interest exists in dead bodies,252 family members are legally en-
titled to ensure no desecration of the corpse occurs.253 Additionally, much reverence
is paid to the final wishes of the deceased.254 Wills and testaments are honored when
they are legal and binding.255 The intent of an individual to give his estate to a partic-
ular person is similar to his intent to give his organs to a needy recipient. “Although
a body is not ‘property’ that can pass under a will, courts have nevertheless enforced
the clearly expressed wishes of testators as to the dispositions of their bodies.”256
When an intended organ donor passes away, his express donation wish also
should be honored. It is true that not all transplantations will be successful, even
when doctors do their best and all variables are favorable.257 It is also expected and
justifiable for the organ harvesting and transplantation process to be governed by
rules ensuring safety to all parties involved.258 Unnecessary regulations that restrain
251 See Youngner & Arnold, supra note 11, at 2770.
252 See supra note 148.
253 See supra notes 141, 145–46 and accompanying text.
254 See supra note 145.
255 GORDON BROWN & SCOTT MYERS, ADMINISTRATION OF WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
9 (3d ed. 2003) (“[T]he right to leave property by will is not an inherent right, but a privilege
permitted by law . . . . Each state has its own laws . . . setting forth the disposition of property
by will.”).
256 Mark E. Wojcik, Discrimination After Death, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 389, 431 (2000).
257 See HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2009
OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT tbl.I-6, available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ar2009
/chapter_i_AR_cd.htm?cp=2 (charting the 2007 patient survival rates by organ, which are
eighty percent for lungs, eighty-eight percent for heart, eighty-six to eighty-seven percent for
liver, and seventy-five percent for intestines).
258 See INST. OF MED., ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION: ASSESSING CURRENT
POLICIES AND THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE DHHS FINAL RULE 22, at 14 (1999), available
at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=9628 [hereinafter IOM REPORT 1999] (recom-
mending that there should be established an “external, independent, multidisciplinary scientific
review board . . . ensuring that the system of organ procurement and transplantation is grounded
on the best available medical science and is as effective and as equitable as possible”).
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the success of the donation procedure, however, directly contradict the will of the
intended donor. Because society traditionally respects the reasonable wishes of the
deceased, it is contrary to public policy to maintain a law such as Virginia’s death-
determination statute.
Public benefits also accrue when laws of this nature are uniform throughout the
nation. Much uniformity has already materialized with respect to organ donation.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA),259 for example, contains procedures
and guidelines for every aspect of the organ donation process.260 To date, forty-four
states and the District of Columbia have enacted the UAGA.261 The UAGA Committee
Chairman reports that “the Act brings needed uniformity where minutes are too pre-
cious to permit wasting time deciphering divergence in state laws.”262 Thus, one dis-
cernible advantage of state uniformity is the time saved in eliminating a sift through
nuances in different jurisdictions’ statutes, which ultimately leads to greater success
in transplantation. This will inevitably lead to another advantage—fewer mistakes.
When physicians and hospitals are aware of precise protocol and their thinking is
not obscured by the muddled array of varying state practices, they will perform more
confidently and with greater accuracy. This will result in fewer instances of error,
which can have tragic consequences when life is at stake.
The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) is another product of organ
donation unification. In 1984, the federal government passed the National Organ
Transplant Act.263 This Act created the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network,264 which is administered by UNOS through a contract with the Department
of Health and Human Services.265 UNOS manages the national transplant waiting list
and organ transplant data.266 It has a nationwide system that promotes unified goals
such as maximizing transplantable organs, maximizing donee survival, and minimiz-
ing deaths that occur because transplants are not available, among many others.267
The IOM also believes uniformity in organ donation is important. In a report
released in 1999, it recommended that the federal government exercise even more
259 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987), 8A U.L.A. 3 (2003).
260 Id. at §§ 2–10.
261 See Uniform Anatomical Gift Act Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical Gift Act (2006) (last visited Mar. 15,
2012). The bill is presently pending in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Id.
262 Steve Ferkau, Way to go Wisconsin!!!!, REVIVE HOPE (Aug. 8, 2008), http://revivehope
.typepad.com/revive_hope/2008/08/way-to-go-wisco.html.
263 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2011).
264 Id.
265 About OPTN, ORGAN PROCUREMENT &TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
266 About Us, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/about/index
.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
267 UNOS Rationale for Objectives of Equitable Organ Allocation, UNITED NETWORK FOR
ORGAN SHARING (Jan. 15, 1996), http://www.unos.org/about/index.php?topic=newsroom&
article_id=1503:85b3dc451eb0ded52b3121dc59c438dc (listing UNOS’s objectives).
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oversight.268 It stated, “The federal government, as well as the transplantation com-
munity, has a legitimate and appropriate role to play in ensuring that the organ pro-
curement and transplantation system serves the public interest, especially the needs
and concerns of patients, donors, and families affected by it.”269 Thus, uniformity
also serves the public interest.
The benefits secured from this homogeneity among states can also be realized
by achieving consistency with respect to state death-determination laws. The deter-
mination of death is so intrinsically linked to organ donation that the reasons for
supporting national uniformity regarding organ donation also generate a strong ar-
gument for standardizing death-determination laws. Additionally, consistency is al-
ready sought with regard to death determination, as apparent from the widespread
acceptance of the UDDA.270
Uniformity also helps keep consent intact, another benefit to be gained from
amending Virginia’s current death-determination statute. Because organ donation
is a personal, significant decision, uniformity in interpretation of what exactly it
entails is very important. Organs are usually harvested in the state in which an in-
dividual dies.271 If an individual designates in one state that he is an organ donor,
and then is near death in a Virginia hospital, the harvesting procedure would be
dependent on his time of death as determined by Virginia law. The problem is that
he consented to organ donation as it operates in the state from which he came. He
authorized a medical procedure involving immediate harvesting upon death, not
harvesting a substantial amount of time after he became irreversibly dead. It is
questionable whether the patient’s previous consent applies in this situation.
Perhaps the most important public policy rationale for refashioning Virginia’s
death statute is the societal gain that will flow from an increased number of successful
organ donations. Throughout the country, demand for organs excessively outweighs
supply.272 Because the effects of warm ischemia are known, it is scientifically proven
that organ transplantations are more successful when the organs receive blood and
oxygen for as long as possible.273 Delaying a call of death delays harvesting, which
increases the time the organs are deprived of blood and oxygen. This decreases the
overall likelihood of transplantation success. In a medical procedure where fractions
of minutes are precious, a risk that has no real benefits should not be taken.
268 IOM REPORT 1999, supra note 258, at 133.
269 Id. at 131.
270 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
271 See generally Harrington, supra note 1, at 340, 344–45 (describing how warm ischemia
time “diminishe[s] the quality of the organs for transplantation” and how organs rapidly de-
teriorate after cardiac arrest).
272 OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION, supra note 6, at 46.
273 See Bernat, supra note 37, at 671 (stating that “the sooner death can be declared after asys-
tole, the less damage from warm ischemia will occur in the organs”); Harrington, supra note 1,
at 342 (“[T]he quality of organs recovered from brain-dead, heart-beating donors was vastly
superior to organs impaired by the warm ischemia time associated with circulatory death.”).
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CONCLUSION
Throughout history, Americans have come to learn that many legal problems
are generated by the conflict between their own opinions and those of the state.
Contentions are compounded when factors beyond personal desires serve to counter
state interests—factors such as science, economics, and utilitarianism. Technologi-
cal advancements unforeseeable to the nation’s Founders complicate matters even
further, and what is left can be a seemingly unsolvable ethical, philosophical, and
legal dilemma.
Privacy and death rights, though deep-rooted in United States jurisprudence,
have assumed evolving definitions in more recent decades as medical technology
has progressed. Without any categorical interpretation, states resort to their own
interpretations of constitutional law and scientific recommendations, often result-
ing in different constraints and liberties across jurisdictions, even when attempts at
uniformity are undertaken. Virginia’s death-determination statute exemplifies this
conundrum. In contexts like organ donation, Virginia’s approach to a determination-
of-death statute implicates issues of privacy, personal autonomy, and the right to die.
Virginia stands out against most other states in its definition of death and infringes
upon personal liberties in situations involving the non-heart-beating donor method
of organ transplantation. Though Virginia is justified in seeking to preserve life with
this statute, its restrictions could be more narrowly tailored, thus rendering the law
unconstitutional.
In addition to the due process violation, policy reasons in line with state interests,
such as societal gain and respecting the wishes of the deceased, dictate a departure
from Virginia’s legal standard. Virginia’s legislature should examine the law under
closer scrutiny to determine how gravely it infringes on the fundamental rights to
death and privacy or whether it is otherwise contrary to public policy. Either way,
the clock has ticked long enough; it is time for Virginia to wake up and critically
assess and reform its death-determination statute.
